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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 20011017-SC 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2001 Supp.), in the Third Judicial District Court, State of 
Utah, the Honorable William W. Barrett, Judge, presiding.1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Under the evidentiary rule of completeness and due process, once a portion of a 
defendant's confession is admitted into evidence the entire confession must be admitted 
to provide clarity and context. Here, the trial court admitted evidence that Appellant Jose 
Cruz-Meza confessed to killing his girlfriend, but suppressed his explanation that she was 
abusive and threatening. Was the trial court's ruling error? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of the common law rule of 
1
 A copy of the "Sentence/Judgment/Commitment/Order" is attached as Addendum A. 
completeness and due process presents a question of law which this Court reviews for 
correctness.2 A correctness review is particularly appropriate here because the trial court 
based its rulings about these laws on a transcript of the preliminary hearing, and not on 
credibility determinations.3 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 205-212, 431. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant on 
appeal. This Amendment provides, in pertinent part: 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . 
U.S. Const amend. XIV. 
2
 See State v. Jame^ 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) (trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to exclude evidence of a prior conviction reviewed for correctness); State v. One 1980 
Cadill .. 2001 UT 26,1fl8, 21 P.3d 212 ("The trial court's judgment contained no express 
conclusions of law with regard to [the defendant's] claims of error. However, the inference 
inherent in the judgment is that the trial court found no merit to [his] constitutional and 
jurisdictional arguments.") State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) ("The standard by 
which we review a trial court's decision to admit evidence of an eyewitness identification is 
essentially the same as that applicable to a trial court decision to admit a confession. Our task is 
to review the record evidence and determine from the totality of the circumstances whether the 
admission of the identification is consistent with the due process guarantees of article I, section 
7.") 
3
 See State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Our review of the 
Miranda issue is non-deferential because this court stands in the same position as the trial court 
in reviewing the transcript of an interrogation.") 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 24, 2002 Mr. Cruz-Meza was charged by information with murder. R. 5-
7. He pled not-guilty to the charge and a preliminary hearing was held on September 18th, 
2000. R. 432. At the hearing, Mr. Cruz-Meza's former wife, Bonnie Santa-Cruz, testified 
that on the morning of the killing Mr. Cruz-Meza visited her looking "like he had been 
drinking all night." R. 432 [78]. However, he was not drunk. Id. at 79. He and his 
girlfriend had been in a violent argument and she had threatened to shoot him with a gun. 
Id. at [89]. She had said, "If you walk out of this door, I'll shoot you with this gun, put a 
bullet through your head." Id. at 89. Then he had pulled out his knife and said, "Okay, 
let's see who wins." Id. Then he killed her. Id. at 89-90. 
Mr. Cruz-Meza was bound-over on the murder charge. Id. at 143. Several 
evidentiary motions followed. R. 94-254. Among them was a State's motion to exclude 
those portions of Ms. Santa-Cruz's testimony relating to the victim's behavior and her 
threat to kill Mr. Cruz-Meza. R. 113-15. The State argued that this is inadmissible 
hearsay. R. 112-13. Conversely, however, the State maintains that Ms. Santa-Cruz's 
testimony that Mr. Cruz-Meza said he killed the victim is admissible under the statement-
against-interest rule. R. 113. 
The defense counsel opposed the motion, asserting that if one portion of a 
conversation is admitted then the whole thing must be admitted under the common law 
rule of completeness and due process. R. 206-11. 
The trial court agreed with the State, ruling that the confession would be admitted 
3 
without its accompanying explanation. R. 431 [39-40]. Soon after, Mr. Cruz-Meza 
changed his plea to guilty on condition that he would appeal the trial court's ruling. R. 
378. Mr. Cruz-Meza filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 417-18. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Araceli Vallejo is Mr. Cruz-Meza's former mother-in-law. R. 432 [57]. She lives 
on a farm in Pleasant Grove and often takes care of Mr. Cruz-Meza's five-year-old son 
Joseph. Id. at 59, 72, 83. Mr. Cruz-Meza is close to Joseph and calls at least three times a 
week and visits him once a week. Id. at 94, 97. He also supports hii.. financially.4 
Because of this, Ms. Vallejo is well-acquainted with Mr. Cruz-Meza. Id at 57, 65-66. 
About 9 a.m. on May 20th, 2000 Ms. Vallejo awoke from her sleep on the sofa to 
find Mr. Cruz-Meza standing nearby. R. 432 [58]. He was in a daze and motioning with 
his arms and face. Id He was trying to communicate, but spoke no words. Id at 59. At 
first she thought he may be drunk, but he did not smell of alcohol. Id He began pacing 
the floor and hitting the table. Id. Ms. Vallejo was frightened. Id. at 61. She was not sure 
what he was trying to tell her, but felt that he had been in a fight or was in trouble. Id at 
60. She also testified that "[b]y the way he was moving, he made me think that he had 
done something, like the way he was holding his hands and everything . . . . " Id at 61. 
Joseph and another child were in the adjoining room coloring. Id at 59, 64. The 
4
 Mr. Cruz-Meza's former wife indicated that br is provided some monetary support. 
Id. at 96. However, the presentence investigation report sliows that he owes over $10,000 in back 
child support. R. 326 [8], 
4 
television was on and Joseph did not immediately notice his father. Id at 59, 67. When 
Joseph saw Mr. Cruz-Meza, he ran to him and jumped on him. Id at 64. Mr. Cruz-Meza 
hugged his son. Id. 
Afterwards, Mr. Cruz-Meza told Ms. Vallejo that he didn't have any money and 
that the tires on his car were bad. Id. at 63-64. Ms. Vallejo replied that she didn't have 
any money to give him. Ld at 63. He left the house. Id Immediately after he left, Ms. 
Araceli remembered that she had fifty dollars from her son's job. Id She retrieved the 
money and took it out to Mr. Cruz-Meza. Id at 64. Then Mr. Cruz-Meza drove away. Id 
About 9:30 a.m., Mr. Cruz-Meza arrived at the Home Depot on Redwood Road 
where his former wife, Bonnie Santa-Cruz, was working as a cashier. Id at 76. He told 
Ms. Santa-Cruz that he wanted to talk with her, and she made arrangements with her 
supervisor to leave the floor. Id. at 79. They went out to his car. Id at 80-81. Ms. Santa-
Cruz recognized that the car was the one belonging to Angie Zabriskie, Mr. Cruz-Meza's 
girlfriend. Id. at 81. Mr. Cruz-Meza said he had borrowed it. Id. at 82. 
After they got into the car, he told Ms. Santa-Cruz that he had just visited Joseph 
and that he loved Joseph. Id at 82-83. Then, he said that he had killed Ms. Zabriskie. Id 
at 83-84. As proof, he produced a blood-stained knife from his pants pocket. Id at 85-86. 
He explained that he and Ms. Zabriskie had argued because he had wanted to go see 
Joseph and she would not let him. Id at 89. Ms. Zabriskie had threatened him with a gun, 
saying: "If you walk out of this door, I'll shoot you with this gun, put a bullet through 
your head." Id He had replied, "I'm warning you, I want to go see my son "Id But 
5 
she did not relent. Id at 99. Then he had pu 1 out his k-'fe and said, "Okay, let's see 
who wins." Id. at 89. 
At first, Ms. Santa-Cruz thought he was drunk. Id at 78. He looked like he had 
been drinking all night and he had a bottle of beer in his hand. Id at 78, 88. But he did not 
smell of alcohol and he said he was not drunk. Id. at 79. Ms. Santa-Cruz was incredulous. 
Id. at 84. She hoped that he and Ms. Zabriskie had simply been in an argument and that 
he had hurt himself with the knife. Id at 84-85. 
Ms. Santa-Cruz asked him what he planned to do. Ld at 90. He said he may "turn 
himself into the police" or go to Mexico. Id. He seemed unsure. Id He also asked her for 
money for cigarettes, and she gave him five or six dollars. Id Then she went back to 
work and Mr. Cruz-Meza drove away. Id. at 90-91. 
Shortly before 11:15 a.m. the Pleasant Grove Police Department called the Salt 
Lake police and advised them that a stabbing may have occurred at the Camelot Village 
Apartments in Salt Lake City. Id at 8. Officers Jose Ortiz and Michael Thorp were 
dispatched to the apartments. Id at 8-9. 
The police located Ms. Zabriskie's apartment and knocked. Ld at 10. When 
nobody answered, Officer Ortiz opened the door and entered. Id He saw Ms. Zabriskie 
lying on the floor underneath the kitchen table. Ld at 10-13. There were blood splotches 
on the wall behind her and chairs were strewn around. Ld at 13. A plant pot was tipped 
over next *o her and the phone was pulled out of the wall. Id Officer Ortiz checked Ms. 
Zabriskie and found she was dead. Ld 
6 
Later, State Medical Examiner Todd Grey testified that he found fifteen stab 
wounds and nine incised wounds5 on Ms. Zabriskie's body. Id. at 107-08. Five of the stab 
wounds were potentially lethal. IcL at 107-08. He also found evidence of alcohol and 
cocaine in Ms. Zabriskie's system and he testified that this could have impaired her 
mental skills and physical coordination. Id at 112. It also could have removed her 
personal inhibitions and made her belligerent. Id. 
After Officer Ortiz found the body, the police searched the apartment to make sure 
a suspect wasn't inside, and then they taped off the scene. Id. at 14-15, 19. The medical 
professionals arrived and verified that Ms. Zabriskie was dead. Id. at 13, 23. Then Officer 
Brian Stahle and Detective Jennifer Walton came to collect evidence. Id. at 23. They 
found the following evidence: red liquid droppings on the steps descending towards the 
apartment, Id. at 24; blood on the kitchen table, Id. at 24, 29; and shoe prints in the gray 
carpet in the living room.6 They observed that the windows in the apartment had not been 
opened for some time, IdL at 25-26, and that the porch screen, which covered the entire 
porch, was in good condition and had no tears, holes, or cuts. Id. at 27. Also, the front 
door had not been forced or manipulated. IcL 
The police interviewed two of the apartment tenants. One tenant, Kim McCandell, 
5
 Mr. Todd explained that UA stab wound is a penetrating sharp force injury that is deeper 
than it is long; an incised wound is a sharp force injury that is longer than it is deep." Id. at 107. 
6
 Id. at 28. The police did not find a gun either in the apartment or in Ms. Zabriskie's 
hand. Id. at 30-31. However, Ms. Santa-Cruz testified that Mr. Cruz-Meza had previously shown 
her a gun. Id at 101-02. 
7 
testified that sometime between seven and eight-thirty on the morning of the murder Mr. 
Cruz-Meza left the apartment in the blue station wagon that belonged to Ms. Zabriskie.7 
Another tenant, Jolene Adams, testified that around eight o'clock on the previous evening 
she had heard yelling and arguing from Ms. Zabriskie's apartment. LdL at 136. Ms. 
Zabriskie had shouted that her son had done wrong8 and that she was going to punish him 
to make him street smart. Id. A man's voice had shouted back, saying "I'm going to kill 
you, I'm going to kill you." IcL at 136-37. The man spoke in English and did not have any 
type of an accent. Id at 137. It is unlikely that this man was Mr. Cruz-Meza, who usually 
speaks Spanish and requires an interpreter at court proceedings. Id at 29-32, 65, 75. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
This case focuses on the danger of presenting only part of an out-of-court 
confession to the jury. When only part of a confession is heard, crucial information about 
the context, justification, or motivation for a crime may be missed. And, any resulting 
conviction is not reliable. 
This case demonstrates the importance of admitting an entire confession. Here, 
Mr. Cruz-Meza confessed to Ms. Santa-Cruz that he had killed his girlfriend, Ms. 
7
 R. 432 [122]. On the other hand, Jolene Adams testified that the station wagon was 
parked in the apartment parking lot until 9 a.m. that morning, and she did not notice it missing 
until 9:30 or a quarter to ten. Id. at 138. 
8
 Ms. Zabriskie had a five-year old son who was not Mr. Cruz-Meza's son. Id. at 15, 118, 
134. 
8 
Zabriskie. But in the same conversation he explained the distressing circumstances. R. 
432 [83-90]. He said that he and Ms. Zabriskie had argued because Mr. Cruz-Meza 
wanted to visit his son and Ms. Zabriskie didn't want him to leave. Id. at 99. Ms. 
Zabriskie flew into a rage, accusing him of merely wanting to see his former wife. Id. at 
98. At that point, the alcohol level in Ms. Zabriskie's blood was almost twice the legal 
limit, and cocaine was present in her system. Id at 110-12. Ultimately, Ms. Zabriskie 
threatened Mr. Cruz-Meza with a gun and told him that she would "put a bullet through 
[his] head" if he walked out the door. Id. at 89. 
The jurors should hear this entire story. If they hear only that Mr. Cruz-Meza 
confessed to the killing, valuable clarity and context will be lost. This is particularly 
devastating in view of the fact that Mr. Cruz-Meza plans to present the affirmative 
defense of extreme emotional distress. R. 104-05. Without Ms. Cruz-Meza's description 
of the circumstances surrounding the killing, the defense is unfairly crippled. Only 
ancillary evidence, such as evidence of Ms. Zabriskie's rages and her access to a gun, 
support the defense. And this is unfair considering that Ms. Santa-Cruz's testimony sheds 
clearer light on the circumstances and on Mr. Cruz-Meza's state of mind. 
Two legal principals apply to compel admission of Mr. Cruz-Meza's entire 
conversation with Ms. Santa-Cruz. The first is the common law rule of completeness. The 
second is due process. 
The common law rule of completeness allows one party to explain, contradict, or 
9 
complete any conversation that is partially introduced by the other party.9 This is so even 
if the completing evidence is excludable under another rule such as the hearsay rule. Dale 
A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 53-54 (1996). Further, conversations which include 
criminal confessions are treated with special care. Any mitigating portions of the 
conversation must be introduced with the confession. Dunkley, 39 P.2d at 1109. The State 
cannot select the most damning portions of a conversation, and introduce those, while 
leaving out any mitigating portions. Dale A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and 
Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 75 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 53-54 
(1996). The trial court may not do this either. Dunkley, 39 P.2d at 1109. If a confession is 
allowed in at all, it must be allowed in its entirety. State v. Romeo. 128 P. 530, 536 (Utah 
1912). 
Further, under the principal of due process, a criminal defendant must have a 
meaningful opportunity to present his defense. State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). This means that he must be allowed to present evidence which is material 
to his defense. IcL Omitting material evidence casts serious doubt on the substantive 
fairness of the trial, and compels reversal of the result. State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 
f31, 979 P.2d 799. In this case, Ms. Santa-Cruz's entire testimony about the conversation 
is crucial to Mr. Cruz-Meza's extreme emotional distress defense. Mr. Cruz-Meza was 
9
 Carver v. United States. 164 U.S. 694, 696-97 (1897); State v. Dunklev. 39 P.2d 1097, 
1109 (Utah 1935) (overruled on other grounds State v. Clark, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943)). 
10 
extremely distressed at the time of the killing because of Ms. Zabriskie's behavior and 
threats. And Ms. Santa-Cruz's testimony is the best evidence of this. Excluding this 
evidence while admitting the confession that was part of the same conversation is wholly 
unfair. 
In light of the common law rule of completeness and due process, Ms. Santa-
Cruz's entire testimony about her conversation with Mr. Cruz-Meza is admissible. The 
trial court's ruling that the confession is admissible, but evidence of the underlying 
circumstances is not, is an unjust error. Mr. Cruz-Meza's conviction should be reversed 
and this case should be remanded for a fair trial that includes this evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
IF PART OF MR. CRUZ-MEZA'S CONFESSION IS ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE, HIS ENTIRE STATEMENT MUST COME IN TO 
PROVIDE CLARITY AND CONTEXT 
Part of a statement is as good as a lie. This is sometimes forgotten in our 
application of the evidentiary rules, which focus largely on excluding evidence rather 
than including it. But the inclusion of an entire relevant statement, rather than part, is at 
the root of our evidentiary law.10 Classically, legal scholars have recognized that 
introducing only part of a statement into evidence is akin to accusing the Biblical King 
David of blasphemy for saying "There is no God," when his full statement was "The fool 
Carver, 164 U.S. at 696-97;l Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 4:10 (15th ed. 2001). 
11 
hath said in his heart, there is no God."11 The bottom line is that the inclusion of an entire 
relevant statement is not only historically grounded, it is eminently fair. 
This is demonstrated by the issue in this case. Here, Mr. Cruz-Meza confessed to 
his former wife that he killed his girlfriend because she threatened him with a gun and 
would not let him see his son. R. 432 [83-85, 89, 98-99]. The trial court fragmented this 
conversation and ruled that the damning confession may come in, but his explanation of 
the killing may not. R. 431 [39-40]. This changes the context of Mr. Cruz-Meza's 
confession, deprives the jury of factual clarity, and deprives Mr. Cruz-Meza of his 
planned defense of extreme emotional distress. 
As a remedy, Mr. Cruz-Meza requests a reversal of his conviction and a remand 
for a trial which includes evidence of his entire conversation with his former wife, Ms. 
Santa-Cruz. Two legal principals compel this course of action: 1) the common law rule of 
completeness; and 2) constitutional due process. These principals are examined in order 
below. 
A. The Common Law Rule of Completeness Compels the Inclusion of Mr. 
Cruz-Meza's Entire Confession and Explanation 
The common law rule of completeness is an old rule. It was well-established by 
the sixteenth century, when one English barrister noted the danger of placing only part of 
11
 U.S. v. LeFevour. 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986); DeFrancesco on Behalf of 
DeFrancesco v. Sullivan, 794 F.Supp. 282, 285 n.3 (N.D.I11. 1992); Trial of Algernon Sidney, 9 
Howell's State Trials 818, 868-69 (K.B. 1683); Carrie A. Ganson, Distorting the "Rule of 
Completeness", 1994 Creighton L.Rev. 295 (1994). 
12 
a conversation into evidence: 
It is at all times a dangerous thing to admit a portion only of a conversation 
in evidence, because one part taken by itself may bear a very different 
construction and have a very different tendency to what would be produced 
if the whole were heard, for one part of a conversation will frequently serve 
to qualify and explain the other. 
1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 4:10 (15th ed. 2001) (quoting C.J. Abbott). Because of 
this, whenever one party introduces part of a statement into evidence, the other party is 
entitled to explain, contradict, or complete it.12 As one legal scholar recently noted, this is 
true not only of written documents,13 but also of conversations and oral statements: 
When a proponent [of the introduction of a piece of evidence] introduces 
[the] evidence of part of an out-of-court verbal utterance, whether written or 
oral, the opponent can generally put in evidence the remainder of that 
utterance. Assuming the original part was relevant, the remainder will be 
relevant as well, at least if it qualifies the material implication of the 
original part. 
Dale, A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 75 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 53-54 (1996). 
The completeness rule employs two practical mechanisms. The first is the 
"trumping feature," and the second is "immediate completeness." The trumping feature 
evolved because, at times, one party seeking to complete evidence that was introduced by 
the other party was kept from doing so by exclusionary rules of evidence such as the one 
12
 Carver. 164 U.S. at 696-97; Dunklev. 39 P.2d at 1109; Dale A. Nance, Verbal 
Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 75 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 
75 (1996). 
13
 State v. Leleae. 1999 UT App 368,1J43-44, 993 P.2d 232. 
13 
prohibiting hearsay: 
If [one party] has evidence of the opponent's [out-of-court] admission, the 
[party] may well be tempted to introduce the part of that admission that is 
most damaging to the opponent, secure in the knowledge that the opponent 
cannot respond [because the remainder of the admission is hearsay]. The 
completeness doctrine vitiates this maneuver by assuring the introduction of 
all parts of the admission that are demanded by the opponent and that affect 
the inferences that may legitimately be drawn from tht part of the utterance 
the proponent has chosen to introduce. Thus, the completeness doctrine 
serves a trumping function in that it trumps exclusionary rules that would 
iherwise prevent the opponent's response. 
Dale A. Nance, Verbal CompL eness anu Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 51, M (1996). Effectively, the completeness rule "trumps" the 
exclusionary rules by allow an entire conversation, statement, document, or recording to 
come in even if some of it is excludable under an exclusionary rule. 
The second mechanism of the completeness doctrine is "immediate completeness." 
This mechanism evolved because inaccurate impressions could not always be adequately 
corrected on cross-examination or during later portions of a proceeding: 
[T]he completeness rule [ensures] that a misleading impression created by 
taking matters out of context is corrected on the spot, because of the 
"inadequacy of repair work when delayed to a point later in the trial." 
Therefore, the rule of completeness "protects litigants from the twin pitfalls 
of creative excerpting and manipulative timing." 
1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 4:10 (15th ed. 2001). And so, introduction of an entire 
piece of evidence at one time is integral to the completeness doctrine. 
The completeness doctrine, which was extensively developed in the English 
common law, has been readily applied in American courts. Carver. 164 U.S. at 696-97. 
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As a matter of course, American courts have held that either an entire document, 
conversation, or statement must be admitted into evidence, or the entire thing must be left 
out.14 This doctrine has been partially codified in federal and state rules of evidence.15 
In Utah, the common law rule of completeness remains in effect. Ldeae, 1999 UT 
App 368, ^ [43-44. Several times, this Court has held that oral and written statements must 
be admitted as a whole and not fragmented.16 Significantly, criminal confessions are 
treated with special care. Ld. Any self-serving aspects of a conversation must be admitted 
along with the confession. Dunklev. 39 P.2d at 1109. And, the weight given to the self-
serving aspects is not a matter for the trial court to determine; it is a matter for the jury to 
decide: 
When an entire statement is admitted in evidence, the self-serving part of it 
must be duly considered and weighed together with the unfavorable part. 
LeFevour. 798 F.2d at 981. During the mid-part of the last century, it was popular to 
call relevant evidence the "res gestae" of the case. The res gestae was entirely admissible and 
could not be fragmented into admissible and inadmissible portions. State v. Penderville, 272 
P.2d 195, 198-99 (Utah 1954); State v. Greene. 115 P. 181, 187 (Utah 1910). 
15
 The federal rule codified only part of the common law rule of completeness. The 
federal rule applies to written or recorded evidence, and it is unclear whether the requirement 
that contextual impressions must be immediately corrected remains applicable. Dale A. Nance, 
Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 Tex. L. 
Rev. 51,58-64(1996). 
On the other hand, some states, such as Wisconsin, codified the complete rule. 4 
Wharton's Criminal Evidence §§ 22:50 (15th ed. 2001). Yet others, such as Maryland and New 
Hampshire, partially codified the rule in the manner of the federal government, but specifically 
provide that the common law rule of completeness applies to oral statements and remains as an 
alternative to the codified rules. Id at 22:22, 22:31. 
16
 Dunklev. 39 P.2d at 1109; State v. Romeo. 128 P. 530, 536 (Utah 1912); Greene. 115 
P. at 187. 
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But all parts of the statement are ^ t^ necessarily to be regarded as worthy of 
equal credit. The triers of fact mi eject such portions, if any as appear to 
b:. inconsistent, improbable, or re tted by other circumstances in evidence; 
but they are not at liberty to disbelieve the self-serving part capriciously and 
without any reasonable grounds; and it has been said that they cannot 
believe part and disbelieve another part unless such parts are distinct and 
relate to different matters or facts. 
Dunkley. 39 P.2d at 1109 (quoting the Criminal Jurisprudence). So, not only must the 
entire confession be submitted to the jury, but the jury may not reject the self-serving part 
of it without reason. All parts of the confession must receive due consideration. 
Utah partially codified the common law rule of completeness in Utah Rule of 
Evidence 106. Under that rule, a writing or recorded statement must be introduced wholly 
into evidence: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a 
party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any 
other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in 
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. 
Utah R.Evid. 106 (2002). This codification covers the admission of written or recorded 
evidence, but it does not cover conversations and oral statements.17 These are left within 
the purview of the common law. 
The fact that the common law rule of completeness has been partially codified 
does not justify abrogating the remainder of the rule. States such as Maryland and New 
Hampshire have specifically found that, although they have codified the common law rule 
17
 See Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, TJ44 ("Generally, 'Rule 106 is limited to writings or 
recorded documents and does not cover out-of-court oral statements.'"); Edward Kimball & 
Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law, 1-32 (1996) ("Rule 106 is limited to writings or recorded 
documents and does not cover out-of-court oral statements.") 
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with regard to written statements and documents, the rule remains applicable to 
conversations and oral statements . 4 Wharton's Criminal Evidence §§ 22:22, 22:31 (15th 
ed. 2001). This approach is well-received by scholars. Recently, a writer for the Texas 
Law Review pointed out that such an approach preserves the goals of truth and fairness 
that are at the root of the common law rule of completeness: 
Neither fairness in administration nor the ascertainment of truth is served by 
an interpretation of Rule 106 [of the federal rules of procedure] that would 
allow a proponent to take matters out of context by choosing to omit 
information in the knowledge that the opponent is prevented by an 
exclusionary rule [such as hearsay] from presenting that which is omitted. 
Indeed, if a distinction is made between the interruption context and the 
rebuttal context, an incoherent scheme of rules will result: The truth-
defeating unfairness of partial presentation of writings will be subject to 
correction, but the same defect will be left uncorrected, or only partially 
corrected, in the context of incomplete testimony about verbal utterances. 
No coherent ground of principle supports such a distinction. And this defect 
in turn supports a contrary interpretation. 
Dale A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 83 (1996). 
In this case, Ms. Santa-Cruz's testimony about Mr. Cruz-Meza's verbal confession 
and explanation is wholly admissible under the common law rule of completeness. The 
confession and explanation were part of the same conversation, and the entire 
conversation took place without interruption.18 Ms. Santa-Cruz testified at the preliminary 
hearing that Mr. Cruz-Meza admitted killing Ms. Zabriskie and then immediately 
described the distressing circumstances: 
According to Ms. Santa-Cruz's testimony, the conversation was a little more than 
fifteen minutes long. R. 432 [90]. 
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A [Ms. Santa-Cruz]: He said that he wanted to go see his son. He indicated 
again that he wanted to visit with Joseph and that she tried to stop him. And 
he says, You're not going to stop me from seeLg my son, I want to go visit, 
I want to go see him. 
And she said, I think he said, You don't want to go see your son, you want 
to go see "her." 
And he says, That's his mother, she's going to be there, you know, but it's 
to see my son. And she's always there ever since I've gone to go visit with 
him, she's there, you know that's the deal now, or something like that. 
And she said - seemed like she got into a jealous rage, told him that he 
wasn't going to see him, You're not goii : to go see him and I'm not going 
to let you go out, is what he was telling L ie. 
He said he was walking out and all I saw - all I know is he said that she had 
a gun and she approached him and said, If you walk out of that door, I'll 
shoot you with this gun. 
And he said, Please, Angie, I want to go see my son. I'm asking you again, 
I want to go see my son. 
And she didn't want him to go and that's when he said he took out the 
knife, turned around and looked at her and said, Okay, let's see who wins. 
And that's all he told me, to my memory. I don't remember anything else 
after that. 
Q [Defense Counsel]: Did he say if she pointed the gun at him? 
A: Yes, sir, he said she pointed the gun at him. 
Q: Did she make any threats? 
A: Yes, sir. Well, from what he told me, she said that I'll shoot a bullet 
through your head if you walk out that door, something in that sense. And, 
yes, sir, he said that she had a gun. That's all I knew. 
R. 432 [99]. 
As this portion of the preliminary hearing transcript shows, Mr. Cruz-Meza's 
18 
explanation of the killing is inexorably connected with his confession, and if the 
confession is admitted than the explanation of the circumstances must be admitted. There 
is no fairness in stripping Mr. Cruz-Meza's confession of its context or in ignoring a 
centuries-old rule that admitting only part of a statement is dangerous. Certainly, the fact 
that Mr. Cruz-Meza's explanation of the killing supports his defense of severe emotional 
distress is not grounds for excluding it. Quite the opposite. A criminal defendant has a 
right to the presumption of innocence19 and the right to present his defense,20 and the 
prosecution and trial court cannot deliberately pare the evidence of anything that does not 
support unmitigated guilt. In short, Mr. Cruz-Meza's explanation for the killing, and the 
weight given it, is a matter for the jury to consider and should not be peremptorily 
discarded by the trial court.21 
This case is similar to State v. Romeo. In that case, this Court examined the 
admissibility of three out-of-court confessions given by three murder defendants. Romeo, 
128 P. at 532-33. The defendants were referred to as Zaffy, Romeo, and Corier. IdL at 
19
 State v. Bennett. 2000 UT 34,1(16, 999 P.2d 1; State v. Bakalov. 849 P.2d 629, 639 
(UtahCt.App. 1993). 
20
 See State v. Wulffenstein. 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986) ('The accused is entitled to 
the effective assistance of a competent member of our bar who is willing to identify with the 
interests of the defendant and present the available defenses."); State v. Torres. 619 P.2d 694, 
695 (Utah 1980) ("We are not concerned with the reasonableness, nor the credibility of the 
defendant's evidence relating to his claim of self-defense. Each party is, however, entitled to 
have the jury instructed on the law applicable to its theory of the case if there is any reasonable 
basis in the evidence to justify it. Here, the court was justified in his view that there was such a 
basis in the evidence; and he instructed on the issue of self-defense.") 
21
 Dunklev. 39 P.2d at 1109; Romeo , 128 P. at 536. 
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531. Their confessions differed and all of them contained self-serving statements. 
Zaffy said that he met Romeo about two weeks before the murder in Salt Lake 
City. Id. at 532. They rode the train to Helper, and then to Sunnyside, where they hoped 
to get work at the coke ovens. Id When they got to Sunnyside, they met Corier, who 
bought them two bottles of whisky. Id They drank at a saloon and then bought more 
whisky and drank it up in the cedar trees. Id As they drank, they concocted a plan to rob 
two gamblers from the saloon. Id Zaffy said he didn't want to do it, but he was afraid to 
opt out because Romeo was "a black-hand man." Id He did not remember the shooting 
because he was too drunk, but he remembers falling down and being chased by police 
officers. Id 
Romeo said he and Zaffy met Corier in Sunnyside. Id. Corier provided them all 
with whisky and they drank it in the brush near the coke ovens. Id According to Romeo, 
Corier came up with the idea of robbing the two gamblers. Id at 533. Romeo said he 
didn't want to do it, but Corier gave him more whisky and he eventually went along with 
the idea. Id Romeo also said that he had received a gun from Corier, and Corier kept an 
automatic gun for himself. Id Then they waited behind an outhouse for the two gamblers 
to come along the path. Id. When they did, Romeo, Zaffy, and Corier rushed out. Id 
Romeo said that Corier did all of the shooting and took a sack of money from one victim. 
Id. Later, they divided the money. Romeo, who was discovered with all of the money, 
said that he had merely been carrying Corier's share for him. LI 
In Coder's version, Romeo and Zaffy came to his bakeshop in Sunnyside. Ld 
20 
Corier gave them something to eat and some money for lodging at the Italian hotel. Id. 
After they left, Corier quit his job. Id He intended to leave Sunnyside and go to work in 
Salt Lake City. Id. On his way to the train, however, he met Romeo and Zaffy at the coke 
ovens. Id They told Corier that they planned to rob a man. They also insisted that Corier 
join them. Id. Corier stayed with them, and they all got drunk. Id Corier was afraid to 
leave them because Romeo was "a 'black-hand man,' a bad man." Id They waited behind 
the outhouse for the victim. Id When the victim came, Corier was too drunk to 
participate in the robbery. Id But he heard someone shooting. Id He also said that he did 
not ever have a gun and he never took any part of the money. Id 
Essentially, each of these defendants admitted to some participation in the crime, 
but each justified his participation on the grounds that he was too drunk or too intimidated 
to back out. Id. at 532-33. Also, each defendant indicated that someone else was the 
principal perpetrator. Id In ruling on the admissibility of this evidence, this Court held 
that all of the statements were wholly admissible. Id. at 536. This Court emphasized that, 
while it is true that the weight given to the self-serving portions may be different than that 
given to the confession, everything must nonetheless be submitted to the jury: 
The law on the subject is as stated in 16 Cyc. 1041, where it is said that the 
self-serving part of an entire statement admitted in evidence should be duly 
considered and weighed with the unfavorable part, but that all parts of the 
statement are not necessarily to be regarded as worthy of equal credit. Of 
course, in an entire correlated statement the self-serving portion should be 
considered with the disserving, but as stated, both are not necessarily to be 
regarded of equal weight or credit. 
Romeo. 128 P. at 536. 
21 
Other Utah cases agree. As early as 1910 it was a "familiar rule" in Utah that an 
entire conversation must be submitted to the jury for evaluation: 
And it is a familiar rule that, where a part of a conversation or transaction 
relative to a subject under judicial investigation is admissible, all that forms 
a part of that conversation or transaction, together with the circumstances 
surrounding the persons engaged in it, are competent to go to the jury for 
the purpose of enabling them to assign the proper and jury effect of the 
admission or admissions made in the course of the conversation or 
transaction. 
Greene, 115 P. at 187. 
This was emphasized again in State v. Dunkley. In Dunkley, the defendant 
confessed to helping plan a robbery. Dunkley, 39 P.2d at 1109. But he said that he did not 
actually participate because he "lost heart" at the last minute. Id. This Court showed no 
hesitation in finding that the confession could not be included without the accompanying 
mitigating statement. Id. Also, while acknowledging that the self-serving portion of the 
stateir ::it need not be given the same weight as a confession, this Court emphasized that 
the self-serving portions may not be discounted without good reason: 
Certainly the [trial] court could not properly have admitted in evidence only 
the disserving statements by excluding the self-serving, and, when both 
were admitted, the jury could not be permitted to do what the court could 
not have done, consider only the disserving and reject the self-serving, or to 
believe the disserving and disbelieve the self-serving, unless there is 
something either intrinsic or extrinsic to render the self-serving 
questionable or doubtful or inconsistent. 
Id 
As these cases show, this Court's precedent requires that either Mr. Cmz-Meza's 
entire confession and explanation of the erne must be admitted, or it all nm*. be left out. 
22 
The evidentiary rules support this.22 As Professors Edward Kimball and Ronald Boyce23 
pointed out in Utah Evidence Law. Utah Rule of Evidence 611 may be used to introduce 
an entire verbal statement: 
Rule 106 is limited to writings or recorded documents and does not cover 
out-of-court oral statements. These are normally developed through cross-
examination. In an unusual case it might succeed to appeal to the court's 
authority under Rule 611 to control the order of the proceedings. 
The [completeness] rule is sometimes said not to allow admission of 
otherwise inadmissible evidence, but if the objectionable evidence (for 
example, hearsay) is needed to provide context and understanding, fairness 
seems to require its admission. 
Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law. 1-32 & 1-33 (1996). 
The circumstances of this case compel admission of Mr. Cruz-Mesa's explanation, 
along with his confession, under Rule 611.24 There are two reasons for this. First, the 
22
 For those who may be uncomfortable with the use of common law evidentiary rules, it 
is helpful to note that the Utah Rules of Evidence do not foreclose use of the common law. As 
the preliminary note to the Utah Rules of Evidence indicates, the rules were not adopted to 
abrogate harmonious aspects of the common law: 
The effort in proposing these rules, as with the Federal Rules of Evidence on 
which they are based, is not to codify the law of evidence, but to formulate guides 
from which the law of evidence can grow and develop. These rules therefore 
supply a fresh starting place for the law of evidence and do not present an 
ultimate end. 
Utah R.Evid. Prelim. Note (2002) (emphasis added). 
23
 Professors Kimball and Boyce were on the committee established by the Utah State 
Bar Commission to study the adoption of the federal rules of evidence in Utah. Utah R.Evid. 
Prelim. Note (2002). 
24
 Rule 611 provides: 
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 
23 
admission of the entire conversation is necessary to provide context for the confession. 
Second, th Amission is required to avoid a violation of Mr. Cruz-Meza's constitutional 
rights. 
The second reason provides a particularly compelling reason to invoke Rule 611 
authority. As the trial court's order now stands, Ms. Santa-Cruz's testimony about Mr. 
Cruz-Meza's confession will be entered without his accompanying explanation. And the 
only other avenue for presenting this explanation is for Mr. Cruz-Meza to testify about 
the conversation himself. Effectively, he i forced to forfeit his Fifth Amendment right 
not to incriminate himself, U.S. Const. V, in order to exercise his Sixth Amendment right 
to assert his affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress. U.S. Const. VI. This is 
intolerable. As the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, one constitutional 
right cannot be surrendered to assert another. Simmons v. U.S.. 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). 
And in particular, neither the trial court nor the prosecutor may compel a criminal 
defendant to testify by pulling his extrinsically-supported defense out from under him.25 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the 
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) 
avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or 
undue embarrassment. 
UtahR.Evid. 611 (2002). 
25
 See United States v. Lampkin. 159 F.3d 60~. 612 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (jury instruction 
improperly precluded defendants from pursuing their defense, which was that the principal 
witnesses for the prosecution had testified only to escape prosecution themselves); 
Commonwealth v. Jennings, 311 A.2d 720, 721-22 (Penn. 1973) (conviction reversed when the 
defendant testified only after the principal exculpatory witnesses left the courtroom following 
the prosecutor's threat to issue arrest warrants to them if they testified); State v. Abdella, 82 
S.E.2d 913, 922-23 (W.V. 1954) (where witness in criminal proceeding gives self-incriminating 
24 
To avoid a constitutional mishap, Rule 611 authority should be invoked to admit Ms. 
Santa-Cruz's full testimony about her conversation with Mr. Cruz-Meza.26 
Notably, even if Mr. Cruz-Meza did waive his Fifth-Amendment right not to 
incriminate himself, his explanatory testimony would be sadly crippled because of the 
effects of the previously-admitted confession. The jury, having already heard his bare 
confession, would be unlikely to give due weight to any later explanation. It is precisely 
circumstances such as these that the rule of completeness sought to remedy: 
Where you rely upon a confession, you must take it all together . . . . the 
whole declaration of the party, made at one time, [both] that in his favor, 
[and] that which is against him, must be received and weighed. 
Dunkley, 39 P.2d at 1109. Accordingly, the entire conversation between Mr. Cruz-Meza 
and Ms. Santa-Cruz must be admitted as a whole, and not as fragments. 
To sum up, if the State introduces evidence of Mr. Cruz-Meza's confession, it 
must also introduce his accompanying explanation. All of this was part of the same 
conversation, and it took place in the same location and with the same person. To allow 
the confession in without the explanatory portion would be to change the context of the 
testimony in support of defendant's defense, such testimony cannot be used against him in 
subsequent proceedings). 
26
 While it is true that a defendant is not illegally compelled to testify just because he is 
motivated to do so by the strength of the evidence against him, Harrison v. U.S.. 392 U.S. 219, 
222 (1968), neither the trial court nor the prosecutor may cripple the defense by removing 
defensive testimony. Sgjg Webb v. Texas. 409 U.S. 95, 96 (1972) (conviction reversed after trial 
court drove the single defense witness away by extensively admonishing her against the 
commission of perjury and emphasized that she didn't owe it to anyone to testify). If this 
happens, the defense is entitled to a reversal and a new trial. Id. 
25 
confession, deprive the jury of clarity of the evidence, and deprive Mr. Cruz-Meza of 
valuable evidence supporting his defense of extreme emotional disturbance. 1 iiis is unfair 
and unnecessary. By recognizing the continued application of the common Lw rule of 
completeness, the pitfalls of presenting only partial evidence are avoided.27 
B. Due Process Compels the Inclusion of Mr. Cruz-Meza's Entire Confession 
and Explanation 
Mr. Cruz-Meza has a due-process right to a meaningful opportunity to present his 
defense of extreme emotional distress. State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). Essential to that defense is Ms. Santa-Cr v s testimony about her conversation 
with Mr. Cruz-Meza. In that conversation, Mr. Cruz-Meza told her that he had killed Ms. 
Zabriskie during a heated argument. R. 432 [84, 89, 98-99]. He and Ms. Zabriskie had 
argued because Mr. Cruz-Meza wanted to visit his son and Ms. Zabriskie didn't want him 
to leave. Id. at 99. Ms. Zabriskie flew into a rage, accusing him of merely wanting to see 
his former wife. IdL at 98. At that point, the alcohol level in Ms. Zabriskie's blood was 
almost twice the legal limit, and cocaine was present in her system. Id. at 110-12. 
Ultimately, Ms. Zabriskie threatened Mr. Cruz-Meza with a gun and told him that she 
would "put a bullet through [his] head" if he walked out the door. Id at 89. After all of 
27
 The appellant knows of no Utah case, since the adoption of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which has examined whether the common law rule of completeness, in its entirety, 
continues to apply. One recent case, State v. Leleae, mentioned the rule and noted that it was 
partially codified in Utah Rule of Evidence 106. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ^ [43-44. However, 
that case did not rule on the continued application of the entire rule because the evidence at issue 
in that case was recorded and came under the definition of Rule 106. Id. 
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this, he killed her. Id. 
Much of this conversation supports Mr. Cruz-Meza's defense of extreme 
emotional distress, and he has the right to present it all. Without it, his defense is not 
sufficiently supported. This is unacceptable because he has a due process right to present 
a complete defense. Garcia, 965 P.2d at 516. And this means that he must be allowed to 
present evidence that is material to that defense. IdL Evidence is material if it is substantial 
enough that its absence casts doubt on the fairness of the verdict: 
[The] touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of a different 
result [had the evidence in question been admitted], and the adjective is 
important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely 
than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in 
its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict 
worthy of confidence. 
Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, p i (quoting Kvles v. Whitley. 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). And so, 
the test is not whether the admission of the evidence would have changed the verdict, but 
whether the suppression "'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Id. 
(quoting United States v. Baglev. 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)). 
Without Ms. Santa-Cruz's full testimony about her conversation with Mr. Cruz-
Meza there can be no confidence in the result of the trial. Her full testimony is crucial to 
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress. And, proof of this defense reduces 
the charge of murder to manslaughter.28 
To prove extreme emotional distress, a murder defendant must show either that 
28
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4) (2001 Supp.); State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, ^61, 37 P.3d 
1073; State v. Lopez. 789 P.2d 39,44-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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there is a reasonable explanation for the distress, or that the defendant reasonably 
believed his conduct was justifiable in the circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(4)(a) (2001 Supp.) Further, the distress must have been triggered by something 
external to the accused, not by his own peculiar mental processes or by his knowing or 
intentional involvement in the crime. Lopez, 789 P.2d at 44-45. Finally, the defendant's 
reaction to the external stimulus must be reasonable. State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d 861, 
872 (Utah 1998). 
Ms. Santa-Cruz's testimony shows that Mr. Cruz-Meza v as severely distressed at 
the time of the killing because of the threats and rage of the victim. R. 432 [89]. Ms. 
Zabriskie had refused to let him see his son, and she did not relent even after he reasoned 
and begged. IdL at 89, 98-99. The argument escalated. Id. at 98-99. Ms. Zabriskie 
threatened him with a gun. Id. at 89. He told her again that he wanted to see his son. Id. at 
89. Undaunted, she pointed the gun at him and threatened to shoot him. IcL at 89, 98. He 
took his knife out for protection. Id. at 89. Then, in his distress, he killed her. Id. at 83. 
His distress was not caused by his own, isolated mental processes or by his commission 
of the murder. It was caused by Ms. Zabriskie's life-threatening actions and her drug-and-
alcohol-induced fit of temper. R. 432 [110-12]. What is more, Mr. Cruz-Meza's action 
was reasonable because he felt that he own life was in jeopardy. Id at 89. He had been 
brow-beaten and threatened, and he simply fought back. 
The jurors should be given a chance to assess Mr. Cruz-Meza's defense of extreme 
emotional distress and decide whether it justifies reduction of the charge from murder to 
28 
manslaughter.29 Indeed, it is likely that they would accept the defense. The defense is 
supported principally by Ms. Santa-Cruz's testimony, but it is peripherally supported by 
several other items of evidence. 
First, the testimony of Ms. Zabriskie's neighbor, Jolene Adams, shows that Ms. 
Zabriskie had uproarious, vicious arguments with people. In fact, on the evening before 
the murder she argued for about an hour with an unknown man.30 Besides "yelling and 
screaming" at the man, she "kept on yelling at her son," and said that she was going to 
punish him and make him "street smart." R. 432 [136]. Also, she frequently had fights 
with Mr. Cruz-Meza, and these fights appeared to be violent. R. 432 [93-94], 
Second, the testimony of Chief Medical Examiner Todd Grey shows that, at the 
time of her murder, Ms. Zabriskie's intoxication level was about twice the legal limit. R. 
432 [112]. She was also under the influence of cocaine.31 She apparently had a long-term 
This case has never been tried before a jury. After the trial court's ruling that Mr. Cruz-
Meza's confession could come in but his accompanying explanation could not, R. 431 [39-40], 
Mr. Cruz-Meza pled guilty to the charge of murder on condition that he could appeal the trial 
court's ruling. R. 378. 
30
 R. 432 [136-37]. The man was probably not Mr. Cruz-Mesa. The man spoke in English 
and did not have any type of an accent. Id. at 137. On the other hand, Mr. Cruz-Meza usually 
speaks Spanish and requires an interpreter at court proceedings. R. 29-32, 65, 75. 
31
 Chief Medical Examiner Todd Grey testified that Ms. Zabriskie had a blood cocaine 
level of .06 milligrams per liter and a urine cocaine level of 4.3 milligrams per liter. R. 432 
[110]. Mr. Grey was unable to estimate when the cocaine was ingested or if it was ingested as a 
single dose or multiple doses at different times. Id. However, if it was a single dose, it was 
probably taken "on the order of hours before death. Not very long, but not immediately before 
death." Id 
Her blood ethyl level was .17, and the vitreous (fluid taken from the eye) level was .22. 
Id. at 111. Mr. Grey testified that "[t]his would be considered over the legal limit of intoxication 
29 
alcohol and drug habit that negatively affected her interactions with others. R. 432 [95-
96]. Naturally, such substances could have removed her inhibitions and made her 
belligerent. R. 432 [112]. And, it could have deteriorated her mental skills and 
coordination.32 
Third, Mr. Cruz-Meza's statement that Ms. Zabriskie threatened him with a gun is 
plausible because she had access to a gun. She lived with Mr. Cruz-Meza, IdL at 134, and 
he had obtained a gun. She had asked him to get her a gun "because she had a lot of 
enemies." Id. at 96. Ms. Santa-Cruz, who once saw the gun, described it as "a small gun." 
Id. at 101-02. The police did not find this gun in the apartment when they collected 
evidence after the murder. Id. at 432 [30-31]. It is unclear what happened to it, but its 
absence could be explained in a number of ways. In particular, it could be connected to 
the killing. Possibly, Mr. Cruz-Meza took it from her and disposed of it, or Ms. Zabriskie 
herself disposed of it. The jury should be given a chance to consider such possibilities, 
and decide for themselves whether the gun could have been used during the couple's final 
argument. 
Fourth, the evidence supports that this was a spontaneous killing brought about by 
some infuriating event. When the police entered the apartment, they found Ms. Zabriskie 
of .08, so almost twice the legal limit." Id. at 112. 
32
 Id There is also some indication that Mr. Cruz-Mesa may have had a drug or alcohol 
problem. Altlhough neither Ms. Vallejo nor Ms. Santa-Cruz smelled alcohol on him after the 
killing, Ms. Santa-Cruz's testimony is that Mr. Cruz-Mesa had participated in drug-taking with 
Ms. Zabriskie and that the two drank every weekend. Id. at 95. 
30 
lying underneath the table. R. 432 [13]. "[C]hairs were strewn everywhere and there 
[were] blood splotches everywhere " I d There was blood on the tabletop and on the 
wall. Id at 13, 29. A plant pot was tipped over. Id at 13. And, the phone was pulled out 
of the wall. Id Most tellingly, Ms. Zabriskie had been stabbed fifteen times, R. 432 [107-
08], demonstrating that the incident was spontaneous and highly charged rather than 
cooly planned. 
Finally, Mr. Cruz-Meza's behavior after the killing demonstrates shock and 
dismay. Ms. Vallejo, who saw him soon after, said he was "in a daze." Id at 60. In fact, 
he hardly spoke to her. Id at 59-62. He simply motioned with his arms and face. Id. at 60. 
Ms. Vallejo thought he might be drunk, but she smelled no alcohol. Id Then, after he 
drove to the Home Depot where Ms. Santa-Cruz worked, he still did not behave normally. 
Like her mother, Ms. Santa-Cruz thought that he "looked like he had been drinking all 
night," even though he was not drunk. Id at 78-79. And, he was not "his normal self." Id. 
at 97. He was solemn, quiet, and he had "like a sad, hurt look " 
All of this provides peripheral support for the defense of extreme emotional 
distress, and it shows that this defense is not simply wishful thinking or a lie. With this 
evidence, plus Ms. Santa-Cruz's testimony about Ms. Zabriskie's rage and threats, the 
jury could find that the defense is supported. That being so, the jury should be given the 
chance to consider it. Otherwise, there can be no confidence in any murder conviction.33 
33
 United States v. Baglev. 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (the appropriate test is not whether 
the admission of the evidence would have changed the verdict, but whether the suppression 
"undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.") 
31 
A manslaughter conviction is an entirely viable alternative in this case, and due process 
demands that it be considered. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cruz-Meza's conviction should be reversed and this case should be remanded 
for a fair trial that includes evidence of Ms. Santa-Cruz's entire conversation with Mr. 
Cruz-Meza about the killing. 
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